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COMMERCE, CONQUEST, AND  
WARTIME CONFISCATION 
James Thuo Gathii* 
All the Advantage procured by Conquest is to secure what we 
possess ourselves, or to gain the Possessions of others, that is, 
the produce of their Country, and the Acquisitions of their Labor 
and Industry; and if these can be obtained by fair Means, and by 
their own Consent, sure it must be more eligible than to  
exhort them by Force. 
This is certainly more easily and effectually done by a well regu-
lated Commerce, than by Arms.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n this short paper, I explore the complex relationship between com-
merce, conquest, and the confiscation of private property in the con-
text of war. I do this by examining illustrative case law and other materi-
als. In doing so, I make two primary arguments. My first argument is that 
the relationship between conquest and confiscation, on the one hand, and 
commerce, on the other, is not fixed or even stable but rather occupies a 
continuum between at least two extremes: the absolute power of a sover-
eign belligerent to confiscate enemy private property upon conquest on 
the one hand, and the policy of allowing commerce safe passage during 
war on the other hand. Given this relationship, my second argument is 
that it is inaccurate to portray the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
periods during which the absolute power of confiscation prevailed and 
the twentieth century as a period in which a rule prohibiting confiscation 
of private property during wartime held sway.2 
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 1. 3 CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS 179 (John Trench-
ard & Thomas Gordon eds., Da Capo Press 1971) (1755). 
 2. This narrative of progress from the dark nineteenth century as a time of confisca-
tion to today’s more acceptable rules proscribing confiscation during wartime is recently 
exemplified by the Eritrean Ethiopian Claims Commission. In this dispute between the 
State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Commission noted 
in part that: 
[u]ntil the nineteenth century, no distinction was drawn between the private and 
public property of the enemy, and both were subject to expropriation by a bel-
ligerent. However, attitudes changed; as early as 1794, the Jay Treaty bound 
the United States and the United Kingdom not to confiscate the other’s nation-
als’ property even in wartime. This attitude came to prevail; the 1907 Hague 
I 
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I proceed by discussing the four manifestations of the relationship be-
tween confiscation and commerce. These manifestations include the fol-
lowing: confiscation trumps commerce; commerce trumps confiscation; 
balancing between commerce and confiscation where neither trumps the 
other; and finally, the doctrine of exceptional circumstances under which 
warfare between lawful belligerents and actors thought of as existing 
outside the law are regarded as beyond legal regulation. In addressing the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine, I show how the broad ranging meas-
ures to confiscate the property of Baathists following the U.S.-led con-
quest of Iraq in 2003 is related to the exceptional circumstances doctrine 
that is being used to justify the massive transformation of the Iraqi econ-
omy without fully consulting with the Iraqi people. The paper ends with 
some concluding reflections. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFISCATION AND COMMERCE 
A. Confiscation Trumps Commerce 
The inherent power of confiscation during wartime is traceable to ab-
solutist notions of sovereignty.3 Proceeding from such views of the 
power of the State, courts have affirmed confiscations as an exercise of a 
war power as opposed to a municipal power4 suggesting that war powers 
                                                                                                             
Regulations reflect a determination to have war affect private citizens and their 
property as little as possible.  
Eritrean Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Claims Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea’s 
Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27–32, para. 125 (Dec. 17, 2004), http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/ 
RPC/EECC/ER%20Partial%20Award%20Dec%2004.pdf. To be fair, the Commission 
does acknowledge in a later paragraph that these prohibitions are accompanied by a 
“competing body of belligerent rights to freeze or otherwise control or restrict the re-
sources of enemy nationals so as to deny them to the enemy State.”  Id. para. 127. 
 3. Thus in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (2 Dall.) 199, 226 (1796), Justice Chase, quoting 
Bynkershoek Q. I.P. de rebus bellicis, states that “[s]ince it is a condition of war, that 
enemies, by every right, may be plundered, and seized upon, it is reasonable that what-
ever effects of the enemy are found with us who are his enemy, should change their mas-
ter, and be confiscated, or go into the treasury.”  To further illustrate the absoluteness of 
the claims of confiscation, the Confederate government passed retaliatory legislation 
permitting it to confiscate the property of northerners when Congress passed legislation 
permitting the confiscation of enemy property during the Civil War. See JOHN SYRETT, 
THE CIVIL WAR CONFISCATION ACTS—FAILING TO RECONSTRUCT THE SOUTH 6 (2005). 
 4. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 304–05 (1870). Here, the court 
held that the restrictions of the Fifth (prohibiting deprivation of private property without 
due process of law) or Sixth (presentment or indictment by jury) Amendments did not 
preclude the confiscations since Congress has the power to declare war which includes 
“the power to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which war may be legiti-
mately prosecuted.”  Id. 
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are more expansive than the more limited municipal powers. Other justi-
fications for the authority to confiscate private property during wartime 
include the military necessity doctrine,5 executive orders claiming expan-
sive authority in the conduct of war,6 as well as the kind of broad powers 
the International Economic Emergency Powers Act7 confers on the Of-
fice of Foreign Assets Control.8 
Several American Civil War cases demonstrate the far-reaching claims 
of the absoluteness of the rights of belligerents to confiscate private 
property. In American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, the Court 
reaffirmed the absolute power granted to the government to confiscate 
property without compensation.9 In some Civil War cases, Congress’ 
power to pass legislation authorizing the confiscation of private property, 
even in cases where it was held by non-combatants, was justified as aris-
ing under the power of Congress to “make regulations [sic] concerning 
captures on land and water.”10 
Courts generally upheld broad powers of the Union government and 
army to confiscate cotton owned by southerners even though the Confis-
cation Acts were vague and unclear.11 One case affirms the legitimacy of 
wartime confiscation of cotton as being “not for booty of war, but to 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 69, 
75–79 (2005) (discussing military necessity as a justification for property seizure and 
destruction). 
 6. In Paradissiotis v. United States, 304 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal 
Circuit held that the United States did not affect an unlawful taking of property when it 
refused to permit a person determined to be an agent of the Libyan government to exer-
cise stock options included among assets that were frozen by executive order. 
 7. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981) (quoting Chas. T. Main 
Int’l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800, 806–07 (1st Cir. 1981)), Justice 
Rehnquist noted that “[t]he language of IEEPA [referring to 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) in 
particular] is sweeping and unqualified. It provides broadly that the President may void or 
nullify the ‘exercising [by any person of] any right, power or privilege with respect to . . . 
any property in which any foreign country has any interest . . . .’” (emphasis in original). 
 8. On the role of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, see Jill M. Troxel, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control Regulations: Making Attorneys Choose Between Compliance and 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 REV. LITIG. 637, 652–54 (2005). 
 9. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828). 
 10. Haycraft v. United States, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 11, 94 (1874) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 11). 
 11. SYRETT, supra note 3, at 155. Some scholars have suggested that civil war confis-
cation cases had a direct bearing on the emergence of laissez faire constitutionalism and 
the emergence of a particularly strong right to private property right. Daniel Hamilton, A 
New Right to Property: Civil War Confiscation in the Reconstruction Supreme Court, 29 
J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 254, 255 (2004). 
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cripple the enemy.”12 Thus in Miller v. United States, Justice Strong 
noted: 
The whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that 
[property] is an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy 
of property within reach of his power . . . impairs his ability to resist the 
confiscating government, while at the same time it furnishes to that 
government means for carrying on the war.13 
Although the courts affirmed confiscation in broad terms, the Lincoln 
administration only grudgingly supported confiscation.14 Some Union 
army officers, by contrast, argued that the Confiscation Acts empowered 
them to confiscate slaves as they continued to be described as property.15 
The Second Confiscation Act16 referred to slaves as property,17 consistent 
with the racist Dred Scott view that blacks could never attain citizenship 
in the United States.18 
The enhanced authority of belligerents in cases like Miller v. United 
States was invoked in the post-Second World War case, United States v. 
Caltex in which the court held that military necessity justified the U.S. 
army’s destruction of terminal facilities after the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and that such destruction was necessary to prevent the use of the facili-
ties by the enemy.19 In 2003, the Court of Federal Claims in El Shifa v. 
United States affirmed such broad powers when it held that the Presi-
dent’s designation of “war-making property” was judicially unreview-
able and as such the mistaken bombing of private property abroad was 
not subject to compensation under the Fifth Amendment.20 
                                                                                                             
 12. Haycraft, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 94. 
 13. Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 306 (emphasis added). In American Manufacturers 
Mutual Insurance Co., the court held that there was no compensation available for prop-
erty destroyed as part of the fortunes of war. Am. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. United States, 197 Ct. 
Cl. 99 (1972). 
 14. SYRETT, supra note 3, at 186. 
 15. Id. at 22 (“Slaves remained property in descriptions of confiscation but became 
people in reference to their rights after the fighting, however.”). 
 16. An Act to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and 
Confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes. 37 Cong. Ch. 195, 12 Stat. 
589 (July 17, 1862). 
 17. SYRETT, supra note 3, at 24. 
 18. PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCU-
MENTS 4 (1997). 
 19. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1952). 
 20. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 751, 771–72 (2003). The 
Court in El-Shifa considered a claim resulting from destruction of Sudanese property by 
the United States in retaliation for terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania. Id. at 753–54. For a further analysis, see Nathaniel Segal, Note, After El-
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This strong rule of confiscation also manifests itself under contempo-
rary international law. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
of 2001, passed only a few days after the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, authorized states to freeze and therefore 
confiscate private property without due process and outside the UN’s 
international human rights standards.21 The Security Council established 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of this 
resolution.22 In 2002, the UN agreed to potentially consider appeals of 
over two hundred individuals whose assets had been frozen and who had 
been listed by the Counter-Terrorism Committee as having suspected 
links to terrorism.23 At the September 2005 UN World Summit, a resolu-
tion was adopted expanding the work of the Counter-Terrorism Commit-
tee to include incitement to commit acts of terrorism.24 The resolution, 
however, called upon states to comply with rules of international human 
rights in complying with their enhanced obligations to combat terror-
ism.25 The expansive authority the Security Council has assumed in 
combating terrorism has fundamentally shifted its role from dealing with 
                                                                                                             
Shifa: The Extraterritorial Availability of the Takings Clause, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 293 (2005). 
 21. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). Paragraph 1(c) of Reso-
lution 1373 obliges States to: 
Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or fa-
cilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly 
or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or 
at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or gener-
ated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons 
and associated persons and entities. 
S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). See also Jose Alva-
rez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874–76 (2003) (dis-
cussing the implications of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s ability to impose finan-
cial sanctions). 
 22. The Security Council describes the Counter-Terrorism Committee as follows: 
The 15-member Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established at the 
same time [as the adoption of resolution 1373] to monitor implementation of 
the resolution. While the ultimate aim of the Committee is to increase the abil-
ity of States to fight terrorism, it is not a sanctions body nor does it maintain a 
list of terrorist organizations or individuals. 
Security Council: Counter-Terrorism Committee, http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2006). 
 23. UN Eases Tough Stance Frozen Assets, MX (Austl.), Aug. 16, 2002, at 15, avail-
able at 2002 WLNR 6240311. 
 24. S.C. Res. 1624, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
 25. Id. para. 4. 
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crises on a case-by-case basis to legislating entirely new rules of interna-
tional law.26 Given the unrepresentative nature of the Security Council, 
where no African, Arab, or Latin American country is represented, these 
new rules may very well represent the will of a tiny minority of the 
States in the world today.27 
Even more troubling is that the work of the Security Council’s 1267 
Sanctions Committee, initially established in 1999 to monitor sanctions 
against the Taliban regime, in 2002 was extended to cover individuals 
linked to the Al-Qaeda organization.28 The Sanctions Committee is au-
thorized under the Security Council’s compulsory authority under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter and is therefore susceptible to application 
against an individual’s private property without review or appeal. Unsur-
prisingly, the United States has used this authority in conjunction with its 
Office of Foreign Assets Control without regard to due process or trans-
parency.29 
Another instance illustrating the absolute policy of confiscation arose 
following the 2003 U.S.-led war and subsequent occupation in Iraq. The 
de-Baathification of that country became one of the most important oc-
cupation objectives of the U.S.-led occupation.30 It has involved the dis-
solution of not just the Baath Party, but a whole continuum of entities 
affiliated with Saddam Hussein, including defense, security, information, 
and intelligence organs of government and the entire structure of the 
                                                                                                             
 26. See Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 
901, 902–05 (2002) (discussing Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Security 
Council’s increasing willingness to make demands on states). 
 27. I pursue this theme much more fully in James Thuo Gathii, Assessing Claims of a 
New Doctrine of Pre-emptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
67 (2005). 
 28. S.C. Res. 1267, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1390, 
para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002). For a description of post-September 11, 
2001 international reaction to terrorist financing, see Ilias Bantekas, The International 
Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 315 (2003). 
 29. See Alvarez, supra note 21, at 876–77. 
 30. The preamble to the first order of the Coalition Provisional Authority on de-
Baathification notes in part, 
[T]hat the Iraqi people have suffered large scale human rights abuses and dep-
ravations over many years at the hands of the Ba’ath Party, 
. . . . [And] the grave concern of Iraqi society regarding the threat posed by the 
continuation of Ba’ath Party networks and personnel in the administration of 
Iraq, and the intimidation of the people of Iraq by Ba’ath Party officials . . . . 
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1: Implementation of De-Ba’athification of 
Iraqi Society, pmbl. (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations (on 
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law (BJIL)). 
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Iraqi military, including paramilitary units.31 All the property and assets 
of the Baath party were under order directed to be seized and transferred 
to the U.S. appointed and controlled Coalition Provisional Authority “for 
the benefit of the people of Iraq.”32 Individuals in possession or control 
of Baath party property were required to turn it in to the Coalition.33 An 
Iraqi Property Claims Commission was authorized to return seized pri-
vate property.34 The Iraqi De-Baathification Council, now renamed 
Committee, is charged with the location of Baathist officials and the as-
sets of the Party and its officials with a view to eliminating the party and 
its potential to intimidate the population.35 
A striking similarity in each of the instances discussed above, in which 
the absolute power of confiscation was advanced, is that there was a 
danger argued to justify confiscation as a means of defeating the enemy 
with whom the danger was associated. In the context of the U.S. Civil 
War, courts even justified the power of confiscation where those in-
volved were not belligerents on the premise that there was a mere possi-
bility that if their cotton fell into the hands of the Confederate army, it 
could be used to support the rebellion against the Union. In addition, the 
power to confiscate has been claimed in a variety of historical epochs. As 
noted above, in the contemporary international scene, new institutions, 
such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee, are facilitating the power of 
confiscation among States. This continuity undermines claims that a suc-
cessful belligerent’s authority to confiscate enemy private property has 
receded into historical memory. 
Finally, it is important to note that it is not always true that the absolute 
power to confiscate is always opposed to the ends of commerce. Rather, 
                                                                                                             
 31. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2: Dissolution of Entities, Annex (May 
23, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations (on file with BJIL). 
 32. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 4: Management of Property and Assets 
of the Iraqi Baath Party, § 3(1) (May 25, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ 
regulations (on file with BJIL). 
 33. Id. § 3(3). 
 34. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation No. 8: Delegation of Authority Re-
garding an Iraq Property Claims Commission (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http:// 
www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations (on file with BJIL). The Property Rights Commission 
(IPCC) and the Property Rights Reconciliation Facility (IPRF) were both developed, in 
part, to collect and resolve real property claims. However, the IPCC is a quasi-judicial 
agency under the direction of the Governing Council, while the IPRF acts more like an 
executive agency under the direction of the Administrator. Coalition Provisional Author-
ity Regulation No. 4: Establishment of the Iraqi Property Reconciliation Facility (June 
25, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations (on file with BJIL). 
 35. Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 5: Establishment of the Iraqi De-
Baathification Council, § 3 (May 25, 2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ 
regulations (on file with BJIL). 
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the question might more appropriately be whose commerce is affected 
since confiscation may well only divert the gains of commerce from one 
party to another. For example, in Young v. United States, the Supreme 
Court upheld the confiscation of cotton found within confederate terri-
tory as well as the decision of the Union army to sell it and as such to 
divert the benefit of trade and commerce away from the Confederacy and 
in favor of the Union.36 This example illustrates that it is possible to si-
multaneously weaken the enemy by confiscating private property in ac-
cordance with the absolutist rule, while simultaneously continuing in 
commerce and trade. In this scenario, rather than destroying private 
property, the absolutist rule seeks to divert the gains of trade and com-
merce from the enemy belligerent to the defeated belligerent. 
B. Commerce Trumps Confiscation 
A second relationship between commerce and confiscation during war-
time is that commerce trumps confiscation. According to Justice Mar-
shall in United States v. Percheman, property rights are not abolished 
with a change in sovereign power. According to Marshall: 
The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be vio-
lated; that sense of justice and of right, which is acknowledged and felt 
by the whole civilized world, would be outraged; if private property 
should generally be confiscated and private rights annulled, on a 
change in the sovereignty of the country. The people change their alle-
giance . . . but their relations to each other, and their rights of property 
remain undisturbed.37 
                                                                                                             
 36. Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 61 (1877) (noting “the national government 
acted with double power upon the strength of the enemy: first, by depriving them of the 
means of supplying the demand for their products; and, second, by lessening the de-
mand.”). 
 37. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 51 (1833). The government’s 
position in the case is captured by the following quote: 
What, indeed, can be more clearly entitled to rank among things favorable, than 
engagements between nations securing the private property of faithful subjects, 
honestly acquired under a government which is on the eve of relinquishing their 
allegiance, and confided to the pledged protection of that contry [sic] which is 
about to receive them as citizens? 
Id. at 68. 
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This view is also reflected in British cases of the same period.38 Perhaps 
in overstating the significance of commerce during war, Chief Justice 
Marshall in Brown v. United States noted that the “practice of forbearing 
to seize and confiscate debts and credits [is] universally received”39 and 
that this “modern rule . . . appears to be totally incompatible with the 
idea, that war does of itself vest the property in the belligerent govern-
ment.”40 Attitudes about the positive role of commerce in society are 
strongly correlated with the rejection of any claims of restricting com-
merce such as through the public power of confiscation of private prop-
erty without compensation. 
Thus, French philosopher Montesquieu argued that the influence of 
commerce and industry “polishes and softens barbaric ways.”41  Alexan-
der Hamilton also observed that some individuals believe that the “natu-
ral effect of commerce is to lead to peace.”42 One of the most important 
justifications accounting for the preeminence of commerce over a bellig-
                                                                                                             
 38. See In re Rush, [1923] 1 Ch. 56, 70 (Eng.) (Younger, L.J., concurring) (“Lord 
Birkenhead, in Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft v. Orconera Iron Ore Co., in 1919 ob-
served: ‘It is a familiar principle of English law that the outbreak of war effects no con-
fiscation or forfeiture of enemy property.’” (quoting (1919) 88 L.J.R. (Ch.) 304, 309)).  
Somewhat analogously, in Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238 
(2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit held that a default occasioned by war, economic sanc-
tions, and the freezing of its assets making it impossible to obtain foreign currency to 
repay its debts did not preclude it from finding that Iraq had willfully defaulted. Id. at 
242–43. 
 39. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 123 (1814). 
 40. Id. at 125. In a more forthright statement of the principle, Justice Marshall ob-
served that the “proposition that a declaration of war does not, in itself, enact a confisca-
tion of the property of the enemy within the territory of the belligerent, is believed to be 
entirely free from doubt.” Id. at 127.  However, Justice Marshall conceded that war gives 
a sovereign the “full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy,” 
but that this “rigid rule” had been moderated by “the humane and wise policy of modern 
times. Id. at 122–23. By contrast, Justice Story dissented, arguing that while mere decla-
ration of war did not ipso facto operate as a confiscation of the property of enemy aliens, 
such property is liable to confiscation “at the discretion of the sovereign power having the 
conduct and execution of the war” and that the law of nations “is resorted to merely as a 
limitation of this discretion, not as conferring the authority to exercise it.” Id. at 154. 
Although Justice Marshall appeared to have suggested that the modern rule prohibited 
confiscation under the law of nations and limited the sovereign power to confiscate en-
emy property, id., in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (7 Pet.) (1833), he affirmed 
the rule against confiscation under the law of nations unambiguously. 
 41. See Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, 
Destructive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1463, 1464 (1982) (quoting CHARLES 
MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS 81 (1961) (1748)). 
 42. However, Hamilton himself disagreed with this notion. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 
6, at 33–36 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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erent’s right to confiscation is the salience of private property rights over 
competing claims of confiscation made by sovereigns. For example, 
Alexander Hamilton supported the prohibition against confiscation con-
tained in the Jay Treaty in the strongest terms, stating in part: 
No powers of language at my command can express the abhorrence I 
feel at the idea of violating the property of individuals, which, in an au-
thorized intercourse, in time of peace, has been confided to the faith of 
our Government and laws, on account of controversies between nation 
and nation.43 
The rise of individualism associated with the Enlightenment that had 
influenced the American and French revolutions,44 and the Spanish Con-
stitution of 181245 are closely associated with the importance placed on 
protecting the inalienable rights to individual property from tyrannical 
governments.46 The Lockean views of property ownership were argued 
to derive rights from the labor of the individual rather than from a grant 
from the sovereign.47 As such, some of the framers of the U.S. Constitu-
tion argued that when individuals were deprived of certain inalienable 
rights, such as the right to property,48 they were entitled to revolt against 
such deprivations of their inalienable rights.49 
                                                                                                             
 43. Otto C. Sommerich, A Brief Against Confiscation, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
152, 156 (1946) (quoting 4 HAMILTON’S WORKS 343 (Lodge ed., 1885)). 
    44.  See G. Richard Jansen, The Provenance of Liberty and the Evolution of Political 
Thinking in the United States (Feb. 1, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with BJIL), 
available at http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/provenanceliberty.html?. The merchant and 
bourgeoisie classes were strong driving forces behind the French Revolution in 1789.  Id. 
 45. The Spanish Constitution of 1812 was based in large part on the Jacobian Consti-
tution of 1793. Karl Marx, Revolutionary Spain (1854), in XII WORKS OF MARXISM-
LENINISM: REVOLUTION IN SPAIN 62–63 (1939). 
 46. Jansen, supra note 44.  The French National Assembly, in its Declaration of the  
Rights of Man and the Citizen, written by the Marquis de Lafayette, assisted by Thomas 
Jefferson, included property as a natural and inalienable right of man.  Id. 
 47. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
285, 303–20 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 48. Jefferson, during the Revolution, wrote of the right of people to recognize a new 
government when the existing government fails to protect those rights. See Christian G. 
Fritz, Recovering the Lost Worlds of America’s Written Constitution, 68 ALB. L. REV. 
261, 264 (2005) (“In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson considered the 
people ‘endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,’ including the right to 
alter or to abolish governments destructive of the legitimate ends of government. These 
words are often associated with Locke’ justification for the right of revolution.”). The 
Fifth Amendment provides that “no person shall be . . . be deprived of . . . property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally J. FRANKLIN JAMESON, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION CONSIDERED AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 27–46 (Beacon Press 
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In international humanitarian law, this attitude is reflected in the prohi-
bition of destruction or seizure of enemy property “unless . . . impera-
tively demanded by the necessities of war” found in Article 23(g) of the 
1907 Hague Regulations,50 as well as Article 33 of Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (IV) which prohib-
its pillage and reprisals against protected persons’ property.51 With re-
spect to occupied territory, Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (IV) prohibits destruction 
of private property except where “rendered absolutely necessary by mili-
tary operations”52 while Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibits 
confiscation,53 and Article 47 forbids pillaging by military authorities in 
occupied territory.54 To supplement this broad range of prohibitions of 
interfering with private property during war is the customary interna-
tional law rule that territory cannot be lawfully acquired through the use 
of force.55 
The strong support of private property rights against belligerent confis-
cation found similar expression in the post-Second World War period, 
when a jurist noted that the norm against confiscation of private property 
was an important precondition for the United Nations to build durable 
peace.56 Perhaps building on this view, Article 8(2)(a)(iv) of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, which entered into force on July 1, 
                                                                                                             
1964) (1926) (discussing how the ownership system of land influenced the American 
Revolution). 
 49. David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: 
Conjuring With the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879, 886 (1996). The framers were 
highly skeptical of a powerful centralized government and favored an inherent right of 
the citizenry to revolt when deprived of certain inalienable rights. Id. 
 50. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
 51. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War art. 33, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 52. Id. art. 53. 
 53. Hague Regulations, supra note 50, art. 46. 
 54. Id. art. 47. Notably, in the 1970s, the U.S. State Department took the position that 
Israel’s occupation of the Gulf of Suez did not authorize it to violate the concessionary 
rights granted by Egypt to an American corporation, as these rights were protected under 
the law of belligerent occupation. Memorandum of Law, Monroe Leigh, United States 
Department of State, Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of 
Suez (Oct. 1, 1976), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 733, 750–53 (1977). 
 55. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
Annex, G.A. Res. 2625, para. 1, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. 
A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 56. John Dickinson, Enemy-Owned Property: Restitution or Confiscation?, 22 
FOREIGN AFF. 126, 141 (1943). 
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2002, makes it a war crime to engage in “extensive destruction and ap-
propriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and unwantonly.” 
In Congo v. Uganda, decided by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in December 2005, the Court found against Uganda for violating 
rules proscribing the looting, plundering, and exploitation of the natural 
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.57 Similarly, in De-
cember 2005, the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission found Ethiopia 
liable for failing to compensate Eritrean civilians whose trucks and buses 
it had requisitioned contrary to international law rules requiring full 
compensation for wartime confiscations.58 
The reinforcement of the primacy of private property over the rights of 
belligerents to confiscate it in the foregoing rules and cases is belied by 
other rules and cases that continue to justify the confiscation of private 
property without compensation. I outlined a variety of such rules in Part 
II.A above. Professor Joseph Singer has, for example, shown how, not-
withstanding the extremely strong support for private property rights in 
the United States, courts have simultaneously justified the uncompen-
sated taking of American Indian property.59 On the international level, I 
have demonstrated how the deferential application of the rules prohibit-
ing interference with the private property of Italians and Germans during 
the post-Second World War Allied occupation stands in sharp contrast 
with the widespread disregard of these rules in the non-Western societies 
of Japan after the Second World War and Iraq following the U.S.-led 
war.60 In short, there is a tension between the right to private property 
and a sovereign’s claim to broad ranging power. As Franz Neumann ob-
served regarding the opposition between sovereignty and the rule of 
law—if we were to imagine the limitation of the sovereign right to con-
                                                                                                             
 57. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 7, 75–79 (Dec. 19). The Court found that Uganda had failed to live up to its 
obligation of vigilance as an occupying power as required by Article 43 of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 by failing to stop the “looting, plundering and exploitation” of the 
natural resources of the Congolese territory it occupied. Id. at 79. 
 58. Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Loss of Property in Ethiopia 
Owned by Non-Residents, Eritrea’s Claim 24, paras. 15–26 (Dec. 19, 2005), available  
at http://pca-cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/EECC/FINAL%20ER%20CLAIM%2024.pdf; see 
also Partial Claims Award, Civilians Claims 15, 16, 23, 27–32, supra note 2, paras. 123–
52. 
 59. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–5 
(1991). 
 60. James Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Occupa-
tion: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 491, 542–
46 (2004). 
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fiscate as limited by the rule of law—whenever a reconciliation between 
the two is sought, “insoluble contradictions” arise.61 
C. Balancing Between Commerce and Confiscation 
Courts and jurists invented a number of doctrines between the two ir-
reconcilable views of the absolute right of confiscation during wartime, 
on the one hand, and the freedom of commerce during wartime, on the 
other. Thus the third manifestation of the relationship between commerce 
and confiscation during wartime that I address here is a continuum be-
tween these two otherwise opposing ideas. In the United States, the bal-
ancing between the right to confiscate and to engage in commerce during 
war found its clearest expression when the United States was less power-
ful as an economic and military state relative to Britain and France and at 
a time when countries like the Netherlands had superior naval capabili-
ties in safeguarding their commerce. To illustrate this balancing, I will 
also examine confiscation cases arising from the American Civil War, 
particularly those that arose in relation to congressional limitations on the 
Union government’s power to confiscate the assets of southerners. 
The first doctrine I will examine is that of suspension and restoration. 
One of the best cases illustrating this doctrine is Hanger v. Abbott, a 
Civil War case in which the Court held that debts and executed contracts 
that existed prior to the Civil War and that played no part in undertaking 
the war, even though confiscated, remained suspended during the war 
                                                                                                             
 61. FRANZ NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
IN MODERN SOCIETY 4 (1986).  Justice Marshall recognized this dilemma in Brown, 12 
U.S. at 122–23, where he noted: 
[W]ar gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the 
property of the enemy wherever found . . . . The mitigations of this rigid rule, 
which the humane and wise policy of modern times has introduced into prac-
tice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the 
right itself. That remains undiminished, and when the sovereign authority shall 
chuse [sic] to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to 
its will. 
In this case, Justice Marshall, however, concluded that the modern rule was that in the 
absence of congressional authorization to confiscate enemy property upon the declaration 
of war, there was no automatic power of confiscation. Id. at 126–27. In The Nereide, 13 
U.S. 388 (1815), Justice Marshall, speaking of two conflicting rules of neutrality of 
commerce, one allowing a neutral to carry enemy property without confiscation and an-
other to the contrary, noted: “If reason can furnish no evidence of the indissolubility of 
the two maxims, the supporters of that proposition will certainly derive no aid from the 
history of their progress from the first attempts at their introduction to the present mo-
ment.”  Id. at 420. 
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and revived with the restoration of peace.62 By contrast, under the rule in 
this case, executory contracts are dissolved on the premise that “all trad-
ing, negotiation, communication, and intercourse between the citizens of 
one of the belligerents with those of the other” ceased with the declara-
tion of war.63 The doctrine of suspension enunciated in Hanger v. Abbott 
is a sharp departure from cases like Miller v. United States in which the 
Supreme Court had held that the mere presence of property within the 
enemy territory made the property of those present therein subject to cap-
ture and confiscation.64 
Closely related to the doctrine of suspension is the view of the Su-
preme Court in Haycraft v. United States.65 In this case an insurgent’s 
cotton had been confiscated and sold by the Union government during 
the Civil War. The insurgent then sought amnesty and pardon as pro-
vided by statute in order to be entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale 
of his or her property.66 Under the statute, pardon and amnesty therefore 
had the effect of restoring the property rights of the insurgent or enemy 
whose property had been confiscated. In Klein v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that under the 1863 Captured and Abandoned Property 
Act, those who had not given aid or comfort to the rebellion and whose 
property had nonetheless been seized or confiscated were not divested of 
their ownership in the captured property.67 
                                                                                                             
 62. Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 536 (1867). The court also notes that this rule is 
justified by the fact that a creditor has no ability to sue for the debt during the war since 
the courts where the debtor is located are closed or inaccessible. Thus, the law of nations 
results in the suspension of the debt during the pendency of the war. The court also notes 
that the statute of limitations stops running with declaration of the war and with the return 
to peace, the statute of limitations starts to run.  Id. at 539–40. 
 63. Id. at 535. By contrast, executed contracts such as a preexisting debt are not dis-
solved but suspended. Id. at 536. 
 64. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 306 (1870); see id. at 317–18 
(Field, J., dissenting). 
 65. Haycraft v. United States, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 11 (1874). 
 66. Id. at 95–96. See also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 128–29 (1871). 
 67. Klein, 80 U.S. at 139 (holding in part: “(1.) That the cotton of the petitioner was, 
by the general policy of the government, exempt from capture after the National forces 
took possession of Savannah. (2.) That this policy was subject to modification by the 
government, or by the commanding general, in the exercise of his military discretion. (3.) 
 That the right of possession in private property is not changed, in general, by capture of 
the place where it happens to be, except upon actual seizure in obedience to the orders of 
the commanding general.”) (emphasis added).  Another doctrine demonstrating that the 
absolute power of confiscation had moderating doctrines is the rule permitting transac-
tions that are the result of necessity between an alien enemy and a citizen.  See Hallet v. 
Jenks, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 210 (1805).   
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The United States was even more circumspect in exercising a right to 
confiscation in its international relations in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Thomas Jefferson reflected this caution in 1793 when 
he summed up U.S. policy on confiscation of a belligerent’s private 
property by saying that “the making of reprisal on a nation is a very seri-
ous thing. Remonstrance [and] refusal of satisfaction ought to precede; 
[and] when reprisal follows it is considered as an act of war.”68 Thus 
while the United States in its initial years as a nation recognized the right 
of a belligerent to confiscate the goods of its enemy, it wished to remain 
neutral in the ongoing conflicts between Britain and France, and took no 
position on either side in an attempt to “cultivate the arts of peace.”69 In 
Findlay v. The William, a Pennsylvania court therefore observed that it 
was “difficult for a neutral nation, with the best dispositions, so to con-
duct itself as not to displease one or the other of belligerent parties, 
heated with the rage of war, and jealous of even common acts of justice 
or friendship on its part.”70 
The doctrine of neutrality and the caution expressed in establishing the 
legality of confiscations of foreign states announced in Findlay can best 
be understood against the background of the new government’s desire to 
forge peaceful relations with foreign nations. There was a practical pol-
icy rationale for U.S. neutrality. As a relatively new nation, the United 
States lacked the military resources to wage war with superpowers of the 
period such as England and France as well as Spain and Holland.71 Fur-
                                                                                                             
 68. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on “The Little Sarah,” in 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 332, 335 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,  1904). 
 69. Findlay v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57, 61 (D. Pa. 1793). Findlay held, inter alia, 
that as a neutral nation, the United States does not have the right to affect the confiscation 
practices of another sovereign, but can forbid the sale of confiscated goods on American 
soil. Id. at 59. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
    71.  BENSON J. LOSSING, THE PICTORIAL FIELD-BOOK OF THE WAR OF 1812, at 154 
(1869). Lossing notes that a French decree of December 17, 1807, promulgated in re-
sponse to British decrees, in turn sparked similar decrees from Spain and Holland. As a 
result, the commerce of the United States was “swept from the ocean” within a few 
months, even though it had been conducted “in strict accordance with the acknowledged 
laws of civilized nations.” Id. As a result, Lossing notes that the United States was  
utterly unable, by any power it then possessed, to resist the robbers upon the 
great highway of nations [and] the independence of the republic had no actual 
record. It had been theoretically declared on parchment a quarter of a century 
before, but the nation and its  interests were now as much subservient to British 
orders in council and French imperial decrees as when George the Third sent 
governors to the colonies of which it was composed . . . .  
Id. 
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ther complicating political matters, the general population had a great 
distrust and contempt for the creation of a standing military, fearing that 
a permanent military would become little more than a resource for politi-
cal patronage jobs, among other concerns.72 As a result, early lawmakers 
were both practically and politically estopped from adopting a policy of 
confiscation. Instead of fighting British and French confiscation of 
American cargo with force,73 U.S. diplomats attempted to use access to 
American ports as leverage in their treaties with England.74 This infuri-
ated the French, who, feeling betrayed by the nation they had assisted in 
overthrowing the British, embarked upon a campaign of seizure of 
American goods on the high seas.75 
Following the defeat of Thomas Jefferson to John Adams in the 1797 
presidential election, France commissioned its war vessels to seize cer-
tain U.S. ships.76 In January of the following year, France’s Executive 
Directory issued a proclamation whereby any ship containing any item of 
English manufacture was subject to seizure.77 This led to the United 
States’ first quasi-war. In retaliation to French privateering,78 Congress 
authorized the capture of French military vessels,79and the seizure of 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 167–69. Lossing also notes that “notwithstanding the many depradations 
upon American commerce and the increasing menace of the belligerents of Europe, very 
little had been done to increase the efficiency of the navy of the United States since its 
reduction at the close of the war with the Barbary States.” Id. 
 73. 3 HISTORY OF NEW YORK STATE 1523–1927, at 1072 (James Sullivan et al. eds., 
1927). By 1792, Northeastern merchants were already complaining of British confisca-
tion of American cargo. Id. 
 74. Gregory E. Fehlings, America’s First Limited War, NAVAL WAR C. REV. (Sum-
mer 2000), http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2000/summer/art4-Su0.htm (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2006). In 1794, the United States and Britain entered into Jay’s Treaty, 
which authorized British privateers’ use of American ports in their conflicts against 
France. Id. 
 75. Id. 
    76.  See Decree of the Executive Directory Concerning the Navigation of Neutral Ves-
sels, Loaded With Merchandise Belonging to Enemies of the Republic, and the Judg-
ments on the Trials Relative to the Validity of Maritime Prizes, 12 Ventose an 5 (Mar. 2, 
1797), Duv. & Boc. 358 (1825). In reaction to Adams’ defeat of Jefferson, the Directory 
(France) commissioned its war ships and privateers to seize all U.S. flagged vessels with 
insufficient cargo inventories or carrying contraband. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE 
QUASI-WAR 36–73 (1966). 
 77. See Law Which Determines the Character of Vessels From Their Cargo, Espe-
cially Those Loaded With English Merchandise, 29 Nivose an 6 (Jan. 18, 1798), Duv. & 
Boc. 214 (1825). 
 78. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 6 (1801). 
 79. An Act to Authorize the Defence of the Merchant Vessels of the United States 
Against French Depredations, ch. 60, §§ 1–2, 5th Cong., 2d Sess., in 1 THE PUBLIC 
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French cargo.80 While the congressional acts gave American vessels the 
right to seize French property, the laws were not unfettered,81 and con-
tained a number of restrictions regarding the nature of property to be 
confiscated.82 One act provided that aliens of hostile nations could depart 
the United States with their property intact.83 
The United States’ legislated seizure of its enemy’s private property 
provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to define early Ameri-
can judicial attitudes towards the law of nations. In the 1801 opinion in 
Talbot v. Seeman, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, upheld 
the constitutionality of the 1798 and 1799 congressional acts designed to 
safeguard U.S. commerce from armed foreign vessels,84 but limited the 
scope of the acts’ application, and provided some criticism of the doc-
trine of confiscation.85 In The Nereide, Marshall articulated the principle 
that war does not confer the right to confiscate the goods of a friend,86 
and that property belonging to a neutral nation found on a belligerent 
ship was not belligerent in nature, and thus not subject to confiscation.87 
According to Marshall, it was “harsh indeed to condemn neutral prop-
erty, in a case in which it was clearly proved to be neutral.”88 
                                                                                                             
STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 572–73 (Richard Peters ed., 
Little & Brown 1845) (1798) [hereinafter PUBLIC STATUTES]. 
 80. An Act to Further Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the United 
States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 2, § 6, 5th Cong., 3d Sess., in 
PUBLIC STATUTES, supra note 79, at 615–16. 
 81. See Fehlings, supra note 74. Congress specifically withheld the right to prey upon 
unarmed French vessels in fear of an all-out war between the French and the United 
States. The United States’ reluctance to authorize seizure of unarmed French vessels was 
less a product of enlightened thinking and more the product of America’s fear of an all- 
out war and possible French invasion. Id. 
 82. See An Act to Further Suspend the Commercial Intercourse Between the United 
States and France, and the Dependencies Thereof, ch. 2, § 6, 5th Cong., 3d Sess., in 
PUBLIC STATUTES, supra note 79, at 615–16. 
 83. Id. at 615; see 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 132 (O.W. 
Holmes, Jr. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826).  
 84. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1, 9, 31 (1801). 
 85. Id. at 41. Marshall wrote that a violation of the law of nations by one belligerent 
did not justify a subsequent retributive violation by the other belligerent. Marshall added 
that remonstrance was the appropriate initial course of action for an aggrieved nation, but 
conceded that once all remonstrative options had been exhausted, use of hostilities was in 
conformity with the law of nations. Id. 
 86. The Nereide, 13 U.S. at 418–19. Marshall attributed recent variations of this prin-
ciple to nations acting in their own self-interest, deeming a non-belligerent’s right to 
avoid confiscation as a “simple and natural principle of public law.” Id. at 419. 
 87. Id. at 419–20. 
 88. Id. at 417. 
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American efforts at retaliation showed little success, and by 1800, 
French military vessels and privateers had seized over two thousand 
American vessels.89 Throughout the next decade, the French government 
continued to issue decrees and proclamations authorizing the seizure of 
American vessels and property.90 This provided ample opportunity for 
Jefferson’s political opponents to criticize his policy.91 
A further complication to U.S. policy on confiscation and commerce 
was the increasing number of English confiscations of American vessels 
on the high seas.92 With congressional acts authorizing the United States 
to seize belligerent property having little to no effect on French and Brit-
ish privateering, President Jefferson offered a new policy approach 
whereby the United States would cut economic ties with countries con-
fiscating the private property of its citizens.93 The effects of this policy 
                                                                                                             
 89. See Fehlings, supra note 74. In 1797, Secretary of State Pickering reported to 
Congress that during the previous eleven months, the French had captured 316 merchant 
ships. Id. 
 90. The Berlin Decree of November 21, 1806 declared the British Isles closed to 
commerce and authorized the seizure of both packages sent to England and letters written 
in the English language. Nov. 21, 1806, Duv. & Boc. 66 (1826). The Milan Decree, is-
sued by Napoleon on December 17, 1807, authorized seizure of any ship and all cargo 
traveling from or to an English port. Dec. 17, 1807, Duv. & Boc. 223 (1826). The 
Bayonne Decree, issued on April 23, 1808, authorized the immediate seizure of all 
American vessels found in France. LOSSING, supra note 71, at 170. The Rambouillet De-
cree, issued on March 23, 1810, Duv. & Boc. 69 (1826), in response to the Non-
Intercourse Act, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 (1809), provided that any American ship traveling in 
French controlled territory or any ship carrying an American or American goods was 
subject to seizure. 
    91.  LOSSING, supra note 71, at 168. Lossing quoted a Jefferson critic who noted that 
his policy was “wasteful imbecility.” Id. 
 92. LOSSING, supra note 71, at 158. The attack on the American vessel, The Chesa-
peake, by the British was heavily criticized across the board within the United States. Id. 
 93. See generally L.M. SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO (1927) (exploring Jef-
ferson’s perspective on the use of embargo and its role in the law of nations). The first 
attempt was the Nonimportation Act of 1806, ch. 29, 2 Stat. 379, forbidding the importa-
tion of specified British goods in order to force England to relax its rulings on cargoes 
and sailors. The act was suspended, and replaced by the Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 
Stat. 451, which forbade all international trade to and from American ports. Britain and 
France stood firm, and not enough pressure could be brought to bear. In March of 1809, 
the embargo was superseded by the Non-Intercourse Act, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528. This al-
lowed resumption of all commercial intercourse except with Britain and France, but 
failed to bring pressure on the belligerents. In 1810, it was replaced by Macon’s Bill No. 
2, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 605, which provided for trade with both Britain and France so long as 
they timely revoked their restrictions on American shipping; the President was empow-
ered to forbid commerce with either Britain or France if they failed to revoke their offen-
sive measures. 
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shift did little to thwart privateering.94 In 1810, America’s resumption of 
trade led France to repeal many of its decrees authorizing confiscation of 
American goods.95 England’s refusal to follow suit and the continued 
plundering of American goods led President Madison to ask Congress for 
a declaration of war, and the War of 1812 ensued. 
Following the 1812 war, U.S. policy regarding a sovereign’s confisca-
tory rights continued to shift from the absolute to the limited. Some 
scholars have attributed this shift to the expansion of voting rights during 
the 1820s and 1830s.96 The argument in support of this shift is that with a 
larger populace able to express their preferences through the ballot box, 
politicians began paying more attention to the right of individual owner-
ship of personal property. More importantly, the courts, and Marshall in 
particular, established that it was within the judicial power to chastise 
those sovereigns abusing the right to seize the property of belligerents. 
While many of the Court’s decisions during this time period left the ul-
timate decision on matters of confiscation in the hands of the legislative 
branch, the Court was quick to limit acts of confiscation performed out-
side the realm of war.97 
In sum, doctrines balancing the right of confiscation and of private 
property, in part was a reflection that early U.S. leaders lacked the mili-
tary strength and economic leverage required for the application of the 
sovereign’s absolute power to seize private property during times of con-
flict. As a result, early American exercise of its confiscatory power was 
used as a retributive last resort when all other methods of diplomacy had 
been exhausted. However, even as American military strength grew 
                                                                                                             
 94. SEARS, supra note 93, at 124–42. Jefferson’s acts had little impact on the seizure 
of American cargo, but irritated northeast merchants who expressed their concern in the 
ballot box and in the press. However, Sears suggests that ultimately northeast merchants 
adapted to the embargo as it spurred the development of domestic manufacturing in the 
north. While southerners tended to support the embargo, it actually harmed them as the 
embargo did not encourage the development of manufacturing in the south. See id. at 
125–28, 145–51. 
 95. In a letter dated August 5, 1810, the Duke of Cadore, speaking on behalf of Napo-
leon, declared the Berlin and Milan decrees repealed, effective November 1, 1810. 
LOSSING,  supra note 71, at 178–79. 
    96.  See Jansen, supra note 44 (“During the 1820’s and 1830’s suffrage became wider 
and property and freehold requirements for voting gradually were abandoned.  More 
offices at state and local levels [also] became elective rather than appointive in nature.”). 
 97. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86–87 (1833). In Percheman, 
private landowners used the United States for enforcement of the 1819 Treaty regarding 
Spanish cessation of Florida. Specifically, the treaty guaranteed landowners continued 
possession of all property owned prior to the change in sovereignty. Justice Marshall, 
writing for the court, held that a change in sovereignty does not affect the right of private 
individuals to possess and enjoy their property. Id. 
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throughout the early nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, and specifi-
cally, Justice Marshall, sought to limit the sovereign’s confiscatory 
power, and consistently held that the decision to confiscate lay in the 
hands of elected officials rather than with the courts.98 The foregoing 
cases and analysis demonstrate judicial creativity in managing the ten-
sion between the absolute powers of confiscation, on the one hand, and 
giving commerce a definite freedom during wartime, on the other. By 
inventing a variety of doctrines, courts deemphasized sharp distinctions 
between power to confiscate and the right to engage in commerce during 
wartime. 
D. The Exceptional Circumstances Doctrine 
The exceptional circumstances doctrine is the fourth and final doctrine 
on the relationship between commerce and conquest during war that I 
will explore. Unlike any of the foregoing doctrines, it is founded on ex-
tremely broad and troublesome claims of authority. For example, while 
Justice Marshall strongly argued in favor of limiting the power of confis-
cation without congressional grants of approval, he nevertheless argued 
that conquest99 and discovery100 give conquerors a legitimate title to the 
territory of Native Americans. Hence, in exactly the same time period he 
was urging limitations on the power of confiscation, he was endorsing 
acquisition of title to territory by conquest and discovery. He also fa-
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 89–90. In fact, Marshall labelled the practice of confiscation unjust and 
morally outrageous. Id. at 86–87. 
 99. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (1823), Marshall held that “[c]onquest 
gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and 
speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim 
which has been successfully asserted.” 
 100. According to Marshall: 
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited 
country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first 
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held un-
der it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it be-
comes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned. 
Id. at 591. In affirming this further, Marshall notes: 
This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been supposed to be 
recognised by all European governments, from the first settlement of America. 
The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, sub-
ject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed 
the exclusive right of acquiring. Such a right is no more incompatible with a 
seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment. 
Id. at 592. See also id. at 595. 
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vored the incorporation of conquered peoples into American society.101 
However, he specially singled out what he referred to as Indian “tribes” 
for non-incorporation since in his view they were “fierce savages, whose 
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
forest.”102 Marshall argued that it was impossible to “govern them as a 
distinct people” and because of their fierceness, it was necessary to en-
force European claims to the land occupied by these Indians “by the 
sword.”103 War then, rather than incorporation, was the solution for the 
subjugation of the Indian peoples. Marshall endorsed this subjugation by 
arguing that “European policy, numbers, and skill, prevailed” over Indian 
aggression.104 
As Marshall’s holding in Johnson v. M’Intosh illustrates, under this 
exceptional circumstances doctrine, the power of confiscating or assum-
ing title over Indian territory arises not simply out of a belligerent’s abso-
lute power, but rather out of the presumed backwardness of those whose 
territory or property has been seized as well as by virtue of the pro-
claimed superiority of Europeans over these peoples. Similar to Mar-
shall’s unqualified support of the effect of conquest on Indian territory 
and the arrogance of European conquest, a British court in the early 
twentieth century upheld the refusal of the British government to com-
pensate a South African company whose gold had been seized. The 
court, recalling an earlier case, observed that “where the King of England 
conquers a country . . . by saving the lives of the people conquered [he] 
gains a right and property in such people, in consequence of which he 
may impose upon them what laws he pleases.”105 
This basis of this doctrine in the common law finds expression in the 
landmark 1602 Calvin’s Case where Lord Coke noted: 
And upon this ground there is a diversity between a conquest of a king-
dom of a Christian King, and the conquest of a kingdom of an infidel; 
for if a King come to a Christian kingdom by conquest, seeing that he 
hath vitæ et necis potestatem, he may at his pleasure alter and change 
the laws of that kingdom: but until he doth make an alteration of those 
laws the ancient laws of that kingdom remain. But if a Christian King 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 589. 
 102. Id. at 590. 
 103. Id. Marshall claimed that the Indians were incapable of legally owning the land 
and that they merely possessed it and as such could not pass on valid title to the white 
population. Marshall claimed that the Indians were merely the ancient inhabitants of the 
land. Id. at 591. 
 104. Id. at 590. 
 105. W. Rand Cent. Gold Mining Co. v. R., [1905]  2 K.B. 391, 406 (U.K.) (emphasis 
added). 
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should conquer a kingdom of an infidel, and bring them under his sub-
jection, there ipso facto the laws of the infidel are abrogated, for that 
they be not only against Christianity, but against the law of God and of 
nature, contained in the decalogue . . . .106 
Similarly, Alexander the Great extolled the idea that conquerors dictate 
the law to the conquered, and the conquered are expected to abide by that 
law.107 Even during the Roman Empire, it was “an indubitable right of 
war, for the conqueror to impose whatever terms he pleased upon the 
conquered.”108 There is clearly a lineage of Western thought exemplified 
in Calvin’s Case designating non-Christian and non-European peoples 
not only as infidels, but as perpetual enemies with whom their conquer-
ors could have no peace.109 Some scholars have argued that the prejudice 
against non-believers in Calvin’s Case was a throwback to a very medie-
val time and that this dictum was also quite contrary to the “commercial 
interests of a country which was beginning to conduct a prosperous trade 
with infidels.”110 
It is certainly true that the prejudice against non-believers is medie-
val.111 It is also important to note that this prejudice was sometimes ex-
pressed in subtle, though still Eurocentric, ways in the process of justify-
ing European conquest and acquisition of non-European territory and 
resources.112 For example, in a groundbreaking analysis of the writings of 
                                                                                                             
 106. Calvin v. Smith, (1608) 7 Coke Rep. 1a, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 397–98 (K.B.). 
 107. HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 348 (A. C. Campbell trans., M. 
Walter Dunne Publisher 1901) (1625), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org:81/Texts/ 
Grotius0110/LawOfWarPeace/0138_Bk.pdf. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 397; see 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 409 (2nd ed., Little, Brown, & Company 1937) (1903). 
 110. 8 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 109, at 409. The writ de haeretico comburendo, an 
English writ dating back to 1401, permitted the execution of a heretic. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 435–36 (7th ed. 1999). 
 111. Today, international law recognizes freedom of religion.  International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 6 
I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 112. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard 
Trial of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 
WIS. L. REV. 219, 244–45 (1986). Williams notes: 
Eurocentrically-defined reason’s mediating function, represented conceptually 
in the law of God and nature, was used to determine the status and rights of all 
individuals according to universal normative criteria. Those who could pre-
sumptively comport their conduct according to these universalized norms, such 
as European Christians at peace with the King, were granted rights consistent 
with their status. Those who presumptively could not, such as infidels, were not 
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Vitoria, the sixteenth century international legal jurist credited with being 
one of the founders of international law, Antony Anghie shows that 
while Vitoria exhibited a progressive approach to dealing with the Indi-
ans by arguing in favor of incorporating them within the universal law of 
jus gentium, their incorporation into this universal law in turn served as 
the basis for justifying the imposition of Spanish discipline on them.113 
Vitoria argued that since Indians were resisting the right of the Spanish 
to sojourn on their territory, the Spanish were entitled to use forcible 
means to enforce this right.114 In addition, Vitoria argued that the ordi-
nary prohibitions of waging war do not apply to Indians. In Vitoria’s 
words: 
And so when a war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of 
all enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of all their goods are justifi-
able, then it is also justifiable to carry all enemy-subjects off into cap-
tivity, whether they be guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war with 
pagans is of this type, seeing that it is perpetual and that they can never 
make amends for the wrongs and damages they have wrought, it is in-
dubitably lawful to carry off both the children and women of the Sara-
cens into captivity and slavery.115 
Vitoria’s writings here sound eerily similar to Lord Coke’s dictum in 
Calvin’s Case.116 Like Lord Coke, Vitoria justified as lawful the killing 
of the Indians in the course of the war noting that this is “especially the 
case against the unbeliever, from whom it is useless ever to hope for a 
just peace on any terms.”117 Thus, according to Vitoria, war and the de-
struction of all the Indians who bore arms against the invading Spanish 
conquerors were the only remedies available to the Spaniards.118 
What is remarkable about Justice Marshall, Vitoria, and Lord Coke’s 
dictum in Calvin’s Case is the genealogical similarity in their racially 
charged jurisprudence with respect to non-Christian and non-European 
                                                                                                             
even entitled to inclusion within the hierarchy of statuses accorded to individu-
als in Coke’s English common law jurisprudence. 
Id. 
 113. Antony Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International 
Law, 5 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 321, 327–31 (1996). 
 114. Id. at 328. 
 115. Id. at 330. 
 116. Calvin, 77 Eng. Rep. at 398. 
 117. Anghie, supra note 113, at 330. 
 118. Id. at 328. Under Eurocentric jurisprudence, conquest was thought necessary to 
“‘bring the Infidels and Savages’ . . . to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet Gov-
ernment.’” Williams, supra note 112, at 246 (quoting S. COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY 8 (1968)). 
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peoples. One could surmise that such similar jurisprudential moves arise 
in the encounter between metropolitan policy and local colonial con-
flict.119 As Laura Benton has argued, the extraterritorial expansion of 
metropolitan authority in the periphery produced predictable “routines 
for incorporating groups with separate legal identities in production and 
trade and for accommodating (or changing) culturally diverse ways of 
viewing the regulation and exchange of property.”120 Thus widely re-
peated conflicts between people from vastly different cultural and racial 
backgrounds reproduce similar solutions and rules for ordering relations 
between them.121 The solution under English law for ordering these rela-
tions was “Christian subjugation and remediation.”122 Ordering these re-
lations then is ultimately a question of power.123 
In my view, the ongoing haphazard124 and massive transformation of 
the Iraqi economy by the U.S.-led occupation parallels the expansive and 
extraordinary powers of subjugating non-European peoples as claimed 
by Vitoria, Lord Coke, and Justice Marshall.125 The 2003 Anglo-
American war against Iraq was primarily premised on finding weapons 
of mass destruction to preempt their use in future terrorist attacks.126 
However, the goal of finding weapons of mass destruction came to 
                                                                                                             
 119. For further discussion, see LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: 
LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900, at 4–5 (2002), which has heavily influ-
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 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that sovereignty doctrine emerged through the en-
counter with cultural difference). 
 122. Williams, supra note 112, at 247. 
 123. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal 
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 675 (1989) (arguing that the issues of power and sover-
eignty “dominate the scholarship of ‘federal courts’ jurisprudence”). 
 124. For an acknowledgement of the haphazard nature of this transformation by a sen-
ior U.S. administrator in Iraq, see L. PAUL BREMER III & MALCOLM MCCONNELL, MY 
YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A FUTURE OF HOPE (2006). See also GEORGE 
PACKER, THE ASSASSINS’ GATE: AMERICA IN IRAQ (2005). 
 125. See Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Na-
tion-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 440–45 (2005) (criticizing the United 
States’ desire to establish a market economy in post-Saddam Iraq as in conflict with its 
obligations as an occupying power). See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the 
Future of United States Foreign Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. 
& COM. 149 (2004) (evaluating and critiquing the United States’ political trusteeship of 
Iraq). See also Gathii, supra note 60, at 534–43 (discussing the international rules gov-
erning an occupying power). 
 126. Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Legal and Policy Considerations, 27 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 765, 778 (2004). 
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naught.127 For this reason, other justifications given by the Bush and 
Blair administrations for going to Iraq need to be taken seriously. Ac-
cording to Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, the U.S.-led coalition 
was waging war to “liberate the Iraqi people”128 from Saddam Hussein’s 
tyrannical dictatorship, including his torture chambers. Fully aware that 
the war against Saddam Hussein would be widely regarded as the con-
quest of a militarily weaker and oil-rich country, President Bush argued 
that the United States exercises its “power without conquest” and that it 
sacrifices “for the liberty of strangers.”129 Thus, according to President 
Bush: 
America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our 
most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of 
empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dig-
nity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause 
with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special call-
ing: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom.130 
Clearly then, spreading freedom and other humanitarian goals clothe 
the geopolitical ambitions of conquering states today as did the mission 
to spread the benefits of civilization during the times of Spanish conquest 
of the New World as seen by jurists like Vitoria. Similar to the jurispru-
dence of Justice Marshall with regard to American Indians or of Lord 
Coke with regard to the Irish in Calvin’s Case, the cause of freedom that 
justified the 2003 war against Iraq is an expression of military power 
laced with the desire to subjugate so-called “primitive” peoples.131 
The mission of bringing freedom to Iraq and to the Middle East is no 
less informed by a view that presupposes the superiority and inevitability 
                                                                                                             
 127. Robert Cryer & A. P. Simester, Iraq and the Use of Force: Do the Side-Effects 
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of the values of liberty and freedom as Western norms to be spread 
around the globe with forcible means if need be.132 This then parallels 
Vitoria’s sixteenth century views that the Spanish were free to wage war 
against the Indians if they resisted the right of the Spanish to sojourn in 
the New World.133 Like Vitoria recognizing the humanity of the Indians, 
the Bush administration similarly acknowledges the humanity of the 
Iraqis and the peoples of the Middle East,134 but it nevertheless justifies 
the use of force to spread the benefits of freedom to them.135 
Lurking136 behind these humanitarian justifications is the fact that the 
United States and the United Kingdom were unable to procure Security 
Council consent to use force against Iraq or even to build a broad based 
coalition in the war effort.137 Thus, it is legitimate to ask whether the rea-
sons given for the invasion were pretexts for seeking control of one of 
the richest oil sources in the world today or whether it was to demon-
strate the unparalleled military might of the United States to other rogue 
states. 
The U.S.-led coalition also assumed broad powers in government-
occupied Iraq. After the coalition single-handedly appointed Civilian 
Governor Paul Bremer without any apparent consultation with the then 
                                                                                                             
 132. Jacinta O’Hagan, Conflict, Convergence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Cul-
ture in Reframing World Order, 9 TRANSNAT’L  L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 537, 565 (1999) 
(describing a “clash of civilizations” analysis where Western universalism “projects 
Western evolved norms and values” including the use of force as a means to achieve that 
end). 
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U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council,138 Bremer issued a series of 
wide-ranging orders authorizing, among other things, foreign investors to 
own up to one hundred percent interests in Iraqi companies (without 
profit repatriation conditions) in virtually all sectors of the economy139 
while leaving the oil industry in the hands of a professional management 
team who would be independent from political control;140 the appoint-
ment of a former Shell Oil Company CEO to be chair of an advisory 
committee to oversee the rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil industry;141 a flat 
tax;142 a U.S.-Middle East free trade area;143 the privatization of the po-
lice force;144 formation of a stock market with electronic trading;145 and 
the establishment of modern income tax, banking, and commercial law 
systems under the direction of U.S. contractors.146 
A secret plan dubbed “Moving the Iraqi Economy From Recovery to 
Sustainable Growth,” drafted in part by U.S. Treasury Department offi-
cials, is widely regarded as a blueprint for reorganizing the Iraqi econ-
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omy along a free market model.147 Two primary premises of the privati-
zation effort underpinning this effort were that Western-based firms are 
capable of making Iraq’s assets and resources more productive and that 
private ownership at a time when there is no stable government in the 
country is preferable to public ownership of assets.148 In addition, these 
reforms are predicated on the view that a future Iraqi government organ-
ized around a model of free market democracy would be unlikely to be-
come dictatorial or inclined to develop weapons of mass destruction as 
the Saddam Hussein regime.149 These reforms have been widely criti-
cized for being thinly veiled plans to give multinational corporations ac-
cess to Iraqi assets.150 
The exercise of these expansive powers to transform Iraq into a free 
market economy incorporating controversial elements such as a flat tax 
have been justified as falling within the scope of the Coalition Provi-
sional Authority’s (CPA) mandate of promoting “the welfare of the Iraqi 
people through the effective administration of the territory”151 and assist-
ing in the “economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable 
development . . . .”152 While this Security Council Resolution is at best a 
controversial source of such expansive authority, it is scarcely arguable 
that the powers exercised by the CPA in signing privatization contracts 
lacked legitimacy among a broad range of Iraqis153 and potentially may 
be subject to reversal by a post-occupation Iraqi regime exercising its 
internationally recognized sovereignty over its natural and other re-
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sources.154 Further, justifying a broad mandate on the premise that it is 
consistent with the welfare of the Iraqi people is very reminiscent of the 
“sacred trust of civilization” under which European countries justified 
their mission of colonial rule and administration.155 
Thus, in addition to the broad ranging measures confiscating the prop-
erty of Baathists discussed earlier in this paper and the massive transfor-
mation of the Iraqi economy without the consent of the Iraqi people 
based on the presumed superiority of the free market model of economic 
governance and constitutional democracy, the occupation forces have 
exercised extremely broad powers to transform the Iraqi economy into 
something of an idyllic bastion of the free markets.156 Even the U.S. 
economy is not governed by market norms as extensively as U.S. re-
forms in Iraq suggest. For example, the conservative economic idea of a 
free tax imposed in Iraq has found little attraction in the United States. 
Further, it is ironic that the Bush administration, claiming the unassail-
able superiority of its conception of both human and economic freedom, 
has itself been responsible for torturing Iraqis157 as well as massive eco-
nomic corruption.158 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, commerce has often been 
thought of as an antidote to war and wartime confiscation. In this Article, 
I have demonstrated that the relationship between war and the confisca-
tion of private property is more complicated. The view that either com-
merce or wartime confiscation supersede each other has to be seen 
against a series of legal doctrines such as neutrality and suspension. In 
addition, the continued vitality of the exceptional circumstances doctrine 
under which belligerents have claimed inherent authority to override 
commerce undermines the view that commerce has prevailed over war-
time confiscations. The massive transformations of the Iraqi economy 
and society have been justified on the basis of such exceptional powers. 
It is therefore plausible to argue that it is not so much that commerce has 
prevailed over the barbarity of wartime confiscations, but that at various 
historical moments, powerful countries employ the ascendant ideas of 
liberty and freedom as a means of prevailing over culturally and politi-
cally different but militarily weaker societies.159 My argument then has 
been that these projects of liberty and freedom as promoted and sup-
ported by the most powerful countries contain and sometimes conceal the 
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raw power of wartime confiscation. Wartime confiscation is therefore not 
an aberration of the contemporary international legal order, but rather a 
constitutive component of it—albeit one which no country wants to 
claim adherence. 
A major upshot of the analysis in this paper is that conquest ultimately 
involves the domination of a militarily weaker society by a militarily 
stronger society. The power of confiscation in early U.S. history in rela-
tion to more economically and militarily powerful States of the period 
was therefore carefully hedged by the Marshall court. By contrast, in the 
contemporary period of unchallenged military superiority, the federal 
judiciary has acquiesced to the expansive claims of Executive authority 
to conduct the war and its military policy abroad with little if any checks. 
Similarly, the United Nations Security Council has through the Counter-
Terrorism Committee expanded its authority to legislate and in particular 
to empower States to freeze, block, and confiscate assets of individuals 
or groups with ties to terrorism. However, the expansion of the power to 
confiscate in the context of conquest has not been unambiguous. There 
continue to be efforts to check the unbridled exercise of these powers 
through the human rights guarantees of the United Nations system as 
well as through limiting the power of belligerents to use force inconsis-
tently with international legal prohibitions. Curbing the excesses of war, 
not to mention wartime confiscations, as well as the accompanying racial 
and cultural arrogance of powerful northern states, continues to be an 
important imperative in the twenty-first century as it was in prior periods. 
 
